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Abstract 
The Baltic Cobra Effect: 
Security Issues Stemming from Ethnic Russian Populations 
James R. Wenninger, MA; MGPS
 The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
Supervisor:  Jeremi Suri  
Co-Supervisor:  James Paul Pope 
This thesis uses a qualitative historic analysis to understand the nature of the 
security threat posed to the Baltic States by the Russian Federation.  It analyzes Russian 
foreign policy and actions in conjunction with Baltic security responses and laws to 
reveal a security dilemma stemming from ethnic Russian populations in the Baltics 
whose vulnerability to Russian influence are increased, rather than decreased, by Baltic 
responses.  Finally, this thesis proposes possible policy solutions the United States might 
pursue to mitigate this threat beyond the use of purely military means and prevent the 
ability of Russia to threaten the Baltic States and the NATO security alliance. 
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Chapter I:  Introduction, Methodology and Literature Review 
The United States is failing to adequately prevent and counter the threat of 
Russian interference and influence in the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, 
which are NATO allies and situated in a strategically important geographic location 
between the Russian Federation and the rest of Europe.  However, in recent years the 
most likely avenue through which Russia would likely interfere with and destabilize the 
Baltic States is through “Gray Zone” tactics; that is, operating in a realm of conflict in the 
murky area between war and peace, by exploiting ethnic Russians residing within the 
Baltics.  This situation presents a multifaceted dilemma for United States policy-makers 
and the Baltic States themselves.  After emerging from the Soviet Union, the Baltic States 
established new national identities based upon their native ethnicities and languages, 
largely to the exclusion of their ethnic Russian populations.  Furthermore, as the Baltic 
States remain wary of the Russian Federation and their own Russian populations, they are 
not universally eager to better integrate their ethnic Russian minorities into social and 
political society or government.  The results of such policies are varying degrees of 
disenfranchisement and marginalization for the ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, who 
are often not citizens, where the Russian language is not recognized as an official 
language and where they cannot fully participate in government.  The result is that the 
ethnic Russian populations have legitimate grievances regarding their status within their 
new homelands, which increases the risk that Russia can and may exploit them in order to 
destabilize the Baltic States.  The “cobra effect,” a situation in which a solution 
exacerbates the problem it was supposed to solve, refers to this self-affirming security 
dilemma for the Baltic States in that, out of concern for national security, they do not 
wish to improve the legal and social rights and powers of ethnic Russians residing within 
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their borders, yet by not doing so they increase the risk posed by these populations.  
Furthermore, as this security dilemma resides largely within the domestic sphere of the 
Baltic States, the United States is significantly limited in its ability to address this 
security issue through traditional military or diplomatic means, despite the fact that 
preventing a conflict in this region is a significant national interest for the United States 
due to the far-reaching impacts of  conflict. 
Research in this paper focuses on trying to answer several key questions:  First, 
how and why do Russia and ethnic Russians pose a risk for the Baltic States and how 
have their varying levels of integration either improved or worsened the situation over 
time?  Second, how have the Baltic governments and US policy historically tried to 
counter or resolve this security dilemma and how successful have such efforts been?  
Finally, given the domestic nature of the problem which precludes significant and direct 
diplomatic influence, what are possible options for US and NATO policy-makers to 
remedy the vulnerability of the Baltic States to Russian influence due to their ethnic 
Russian minorities? 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer these questions, I have chosen to use the qualitative methods of 
historical and policy analysis beginning from the independence of the Baltic States from 
the Soviet Union to the present, incorporating multiple sources of documentation.  In 
order to understand the risk posed by both Russia and ethnic Russians within the Baltic 
States I focused upon reporting of Russian provocations, statements from key Russian 
leadership figures, Russian policy documents and the history of Russian exploitation of 
ethnic Russians in neighboring states as a tool of foreign policy.  To understand how the 
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Baltic governments and the US have responded to this enduring security issue I focused 
upon Baltic government security and policy documents, reporting and publications on 
United States policy actions focused upon the Baltics, and the evolution of Baltic State 
laws and policies impacting their ethnic Russian populations such as citizenship rights 
and requirements and language policies.  Based on this research I draw my conclusions 
on what variables are likely to remedy or resolve the security dilemma and recommend 
possible policy options available to the United States to affect the changes necessary to 
promote or realize those solutions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 I chose to conduct a literature review focused on the histories of the Baltic States 
in order to gain an understanding of their unique geopolitical and cultural attributes 
leading to their independence from the Soviet Union.  Accordingly, I chose three books 
by expert scholars of the Baltic States:  Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia 
by Pami Aalto, The Making of Modern Lithuania by Tomas Balkelis, and History of 
Latvia: 100 Years by Daina Bleiere, Ilgvars Butulis, Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga 
and Antonijs Zunda.  This research revealed all three of the ethnic Baltic populations 
hold strong ethno-linguistic identities.  Additionally, the Latvians, Lithuanians and 
Estonians have a firm desire for securing their own states which, due to their geographic 
location between Russia and successive German empires, have maintained only brief 
periods of independence and spent the majority of their history occupied by great power 
states. 
The Estonian people’s history is one of occupation, leading to their strong 
sentiments of independence, nationalism and chafing at the intrusion of external entities.  
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Ethnic Estonians did not know independence until 1918, having previously been 
occupied by the Bolsheviks, Germans and Imperial Russia until being returned to Soviet 
rule in 1940 under terms of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.1  Once gaining independence again 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Estonians were quick to re-establish their 
own sovereign state.  However, in the creation of a nation-state based on ethnic identity, 
the large number of ethnic Russians living in Estonia have been left severely 
disadvantaged in economic and societal opportunity.  This has resulted in a state which is 
overwhelmed with conflicting geopolitical and identity issues:  Estonians view 
themselves as more Western as their border with Russia was the traditional border 
between Western and Eastern Christianity, they have a long history of Russia annexing 
them, yet the large Russian minority group still sees their cultural ties with Russia and 
receives support from Russia to improve their conditions within Estonia.2 
Similar to the nationalist issues in the Estonian state, Lithuania had a history of 
Russian rule fixed in the minds of its crafters.  “Behind the newly created state structures 
stood the generation of the Lithuanian intelligentsia who gained their early political 
experience in the associational network of patriotic relief institutions in Russia.”.3  It 
existed as part of Tsarist Russia’s extended empire until it gained its independence in 
1918 and quickly formed a state based on the Lithuanian ethnic identity.4  By the end of 
World War II, however, Nazi and Soviet occupations had destroyed the state, caused an 
outflow of ethnic Lithuanian refugees, and its territory once again falling under Russian 
rule.5  Furthermore, their history as war refugees and struggle against the military 
                                                 
1 P. Aalto. Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 14. 
2 Ibid., 30. 
3 T. Balkelis. The Making of Modern Lithuania, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 124. 
4 Ibid., xxiv. 
5 Ibid., xxv. 
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predations of other nations only served to reinforce the ethno-nationalist identity of the 
Lithuanian people when forming their newly independent state in 1990.6   
 Finally, Latvians have a similar history of near-persistent subjugation by outside 
powers.  Like the other Baltic states, Latvia had the geopolitical misfortune of finding 
itself wedged between great military empires, leading to constant foreign subjugation by 
successive German, Swedish, Danish, Livonian, Polish and Russian empires from the 
13th Century.7  Like Lithuania, it finally gained true independence in 1918 and formed an 
ethno-nationalist state for the Latvian people, only to face the same fate in 1940 with 
successive Nazi and Soviet occupations resulting in its absorption by the Soviet Union.8  
Like Lithuania and Estonia, difficulties in naturalization for ethnic Russians and the lack 
of state recognition for the use of the Russian language created social divisions between 
the two groups.9   
 All three states emerged from the Soviet Union with similar histories.  All three of 
the ethnic Baltic peoples had endured centuries of subjugation by imperial powers, had 
previously established ethno-nationalist states only to lose them to war and subsequent 
annexation by the Soviet Union, and had experienced attempts at Russification by both 
Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.  As a result, upon gaining independence, the new 
Baltic States had these experiences to draw upon when reforming themselves as 
independent states.  These histories also explain why the Baltic States have a sensitivity 
to threats, real and perceived, from the Russian Federation. 
  
                                                 
6 Ibid., 119. 
7 D. Bleiere et al. History of Latvia: 100 Years, (Riga: Jumava, 2014), 9. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Ibid., 460. 
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Chapter II:  Threat Perceptions of the Baltic States 
Russia is the primary threat to the security of the Baltic States.  In 2006 Alexander 
Dugin, then an advisor to Putin’s United Russia party and the creator of the “Eurasianist” 
ideology10 stated “For the moment, our priorities are not in the Baltic region.  In a way, 
one could say that the latter is an unresolved question in the short term, although in the 
long term Russia will never accept it.  The Eurasian construction assumes a new statute 
for the Baltic region – either friendly towards Moscow, or neutral.  Russia will never 
reach a mutual understanding with an Atlanticist Baltic region.”11  Russia has undertaken 
aggressive actions to undermine Baltic States’ sovereignty, engaged in aggressive 
rhetoric towards its Western-leaning neighbors, demonstrated a renewed interest in 
territorial expansion, and pursued a strategy of undermining non-compliant states in its 
near abroad through the manipulation of ethnic minorities.  Furthermore, it is possible 
Russia could instigate a low-level conflict in the Baltics in an attempt to undermine and 
fracture the NATO alliance.  According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “If 
Russia challenges these countries’ territorial integrity and NATO fails to honor its Article 
V security guarantees, this would spell the end of the post-World War II international 
security order.”12 
The Baltic States are NATO members, so there is the risk of Russian meddling 
reaching a point that one of the Baltic States could invoke Article V of the alliance’s 
security guarantees, yet the willingness of NATO members to commit to military action 
                                                 
10 Shaun Walker, “Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?” The Guardian, 23 March 2014. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/23/ukraine-crimea-what-putin-thinking-russia 
11 M. Herpen, Russia’s nuclear threats and the security of the Baltic states. Cicero 
Foundation Great Debate Paper (Vol 16, Iss 05, 2016), 12-13. 
12 A. Grigas. “Russia’s Motives in the Baltic States,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 7 December 2015, 
2. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/grigas_-_russian_motives.pdf 
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in such an instance is questionable.13  Among NATO’s original members there is little 
solidarity when it comes to protection of the Baltic States14, an issue highlighted when 
Germany initially refused to contribute troops to bolster Baltic garrisons in 2017.15  Thus 
the United States has a vested interest in preventing a conflict in the Baltics, as it risks 
fracturing the NATO alliance.  How and why would Russia risk interfering with NATO 
member states in an aggressive manner and why would it involve the ethnic Russian 
populations of the Baltic States? 
RUSSIAN INTENTIONS IN ITS NEAR ABROAD 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia appeared to be lacking a sense of 
identity and place within the world, but in the 21st century, Vladimir Putin gave direction 
to a wayward nation which began a resurgence in economic growth and international 
standing.16 With this growth in power, Putin, by many accounts a consummate realist 
thinker, directed the energies of the state with an ideology of Russian exceptionalism and 
began to base national interests not on the realist needs for state survival, nor even the 
deepening of ties within a liberalist world order, but rather on the Eurasianist concept of 
Russia as a unique civilization within the world which must act as a counterbalance to 
Western institutions and values.17  
                                                 
13 Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe,” 10 
May 2017, 133. https://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-FULL-
REPORT.pdf 
14 R. Thornton & M. Karagiannis, “The Russian Threat to the Baltic States: The Problems of 
Shaping Local Defense Mechanisms,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Vol 29, Iss 3, 2016), 341. 
15 Ibid. 
16 G. Evans & C. Lipsmeyer. The democratic experience in divided societies: the Baltic 
states in comparative perspective. Journal of Baltic Studies, (Vol 32, Iss 4, 2013), 379-401. 
17 A. S. Bowen & M. Galeotti. Putin’s Empire of the Mind. Foreign Policy, 2014.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_mind_russia_geopolitics 
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Because these national interests are based on ideological concepts, as opposed to 
rational goals of a state within an international order, Russia pursues interventions in 
neighboring states which pose ideological threats.18 The results so far, have included the 
expansion of the Russian state into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. This expansion, 
dissimilar to the types of imperialism seen by Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union, is bred 
from a sense of threat to Russian civilization.19 This viewpoint requires action borne not 
out of rational interests, but those established by an ideology.  
Analysis of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century will often consider these 
actions as based out of a realist view of the state system,20but its actions are driven by its 
Eurasianist ideology. Russian expansion is a direct result of perceived threats to itself 
which appears to be almost the definition of a realist impetus for Russian action in its 
near abroad,21 but it was threats to its perception of Russian civilization, as opposed to 
security threats, which drove these actions.  By examining how the new Russian ideology 
shapes Russia’s perceptions of its national interests and goals it becomes clear that 
ideology, and not realism, drives its foreign policy.  
This can be directly examined by analyzing the degree to which ideology plays a 
part in the decision-making of Russian leaders and comparing that to Russian expansion 
into Georgia and Ukraine, where force and annexation were the means to achieve 
ideological objectives while accepting costs that a rational state leader would have 
                                                 
18 M. R. Freire & R. E. Kanet. Russia and Its Near Neighbours, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
22. 
19 A. S. Bowen & M. Galeotti. Putin’s Empire of the Mind. Foreign Policy, 2014.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_mind_russia_geopolitics 
20 E. Souleimanov. Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia, 
and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 158. 
21 P. B. Rich. Crisis in the Caucasus, (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 2. 
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otherwise avoided. The reason such a distinction must be made is to understand the 
danger posed to the current international order by Russia’s ideology-based foreign policy 
decisions. While similar ‘rogue states’ exist, they are in large part contained and do not 
pose a threat to the overall international order. Russia, however, as a rising great power 
could pose a significant risk to the survival of the liberal international order if unchecked. 
Russian ideology as crafted by Putin does not depict Russia necessarily as a 
balancer as defined in classical realism but is rather more reminiscent of the Cold War 
ideology that Western democracy poses a threat to Russian civilization.22 The threat now, 
however, is to Russia’s pursuit of ‘sovereign democracy’ through a sense of Russian 
exceptionalism which became an absolute necessity in reaction to the colored revolutions 
witnessed in the early 2000s. It is important to differentiate the fact that Putin views this 
as a threat to both Russian civilization and the Russian state, as his idea of Russian 
civilization expands beyond the borders of Russia and into the territories of its neighbors 
in the near abroad.23 
One of the key aspects of Putin’s new ideology is the concept of paternalism, that 
is, the need for Russia to provide a guiding role in its dealings with the former Soviet 
states, which also necessitates that these states accept Russian authority.24 Official 
Russian policy has vacillated between referring to the near abroad as a sphere of 
influence or a realm of ‘privileged interest’ to Russia, but the intended meaning is the 
same: only Russia should have the right and authority to exert influence and, if necessary, 
                                                 
22 A. S. Bowen & M. Galeotti. Putin’s Empire of the Mind. Foreign Policy, 2014.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_mind_russia_geopolitics 
23 R. E. Kanet. Russian foreign policy in the 21st century, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 83. 
24 H. M. H. Van. Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 246. 
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intervene in the former Soviet republics.25 A clear example of this form of interference is 
Russia’s attempt to influence the 2004 Ukrainian elections to install a Russia-friendly 
leader in one of its neighboring countries. The resulting failure to maintain a friendly 
regime through soft power would cause Russia to realize a threat to their ideology, and 
the possible necessity to use more than soft power to ensure its interests later.26 While the 
reasoning for influencing the elections of Ukraine could be viewed as meeting rational 
goals such as ensuring security and trade arrangements with a geographically important 
neighbor, the resulting fear of Western democratic influence was more a result of a threat 
to Russian ideology. 
In failing to influence a key neighbor, Putin felt Russia was at risk, not because 
the new regime in Ukraine posed a significant military or economic risk (although the 
possibility of joining NATO did give reason for concern) but rather because Russia 
viewed Ukraine as similar to itself and a Western-influenced revolution against a similar 
government gave rise to fears that its own ideologically-based take on democracy could 
be at risk.27 Putin’s reaction was to further consolidate the ideology of Russian 
‘sovereignty’ from the West within foreign and domestic policy and to begin a significant 
effort to both strengthen the patriotic feeling of the Russian people and limit the influence 
of foreign actors.28 Putin’s ideology relied on the need for the Russian people to take their 
                                                 
25 R. E. Kanet. Russian foreign policy in the 21st century, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 147. 
26 A. Umland. Varieties of Russian Exceptionalism in Putin's Russia. Russian Politics 
& Law, (Vol 50, Iss 6, 2012), 3-6. 
27 A. Evans. Power and Ideology: Vladimir Putin and the Russian Political System. The 
Carl Beck Papers In Russian And East European Studies, (Iss 1902, 2008), 43. 
28 R. E. Kanet. Russian foreign policy in the 21st century, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 21-22. 
 
 
11 
own path in determining the future of their state and the Russian civilization as a whole, 
since adopting Western principles would inherently weaken their independence.  
To this end, Putin enacted multiple regulations to limit the effects of foreign 
influence, such as restricting the actions of foreign NGOs or foreign funding of domestic 
NGOs which had played a part in the failure of Russian influence in the 2004 Ukrainian 
elections, as well as cultivating his ideology of Russian exceptionalism within society.29 
He aimed to increase and consolidate the power of his own role as well as that of the 
ideological precepts on which the Russian society was to be based by encouraging the 
tenets of ‘vertical power’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ to be viewed as inherent traits of a 
Russian-based system.30 In this process of defining Russia’s innate exceptionalism, he 
increasingly encouraged the view that Russia was not defined by a single state, but by its 
culture, language, history and morals. In doing so he enhanced the idea that Russia is a 
civilization, and not limited to a single nation. This gave Russia the moral justification for 
influence in the near abroad, as the former Soviet republics not only had ethnically 
Russian populations as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also they were 
‘brother’ states tied together by a common history spanning hundreds of years; 
sentiments echoed and enhanced by Putin’s United Russia party and its clubs.31 This 
promotes the perception of Russia as the seat of power within Eurasia; power which is a 
product of and exercised through ideology as opposed to purely materiel means. 
Russian identity plays a fundamental role in the formulation of foreign policy by 
Russia. The Russian ‘civilization’ extends beyond the borders of Russia into those of its 
                                                 
29 A. Evans. Power and Ideology: Vladimir Putin and the Russian Political System. The 
Carl Beck Papers In Russian And East European Studies, (Iss 1902), 21. 
30 H. M. H. Van. Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 57. 
31 Ibid., 118-119. 
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neighbors in the near abroad and thus is a factor in determining policy whose goals are to 
realize the interests of Russia.32 This leads to conflicting internal/international interests as 
reflected by policies such as ‘passportization,’ whereby Russia has used the basis of 
ethnicity to issue citizenship to members of non-Russian states beginning in the early 
2000s, in which Russia grants Russian citizenship to ethnic Russians residing in FSU 
republics to ensure it retains a stake and reason for involvement within these regions.33 
While such action may be a tactic by Russia to instigate conflict both in Georgia and 
Ukraine, it is not a legitimizing issue for instigating conflict,34 but rather speaks to the 
concept of Russia as a civilization instead of just a single state. Furthermore, Russia has 
described its duty to protect all Russians wherever they may be. This may sound like an 
echo of US policy to protect US citizens wherever they are, but with the twist that not all 
Russians are citizens, as Russia’s “passportization” process underscores. This is one of 
the ways in which Russian internal and international interests overlap, as protection must 
be guaranteed, but Russia sees itself as a civilization, and thus by guaranteeing security of 
all Russians this provides for significant security interests and involvement in 
neighboring states who have large populations of ethnic Russians.35 This overlap in the 
near abroad creates difficulties for Russia when distinguishing policy that is either 
internal or international because the Russian identity does not hinge on the state. The 
inability to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’ in the near abroad provides the context from 
                                                 
32 A. S. Bowen & M. Galeotti. Putin’s Empire of the Mind. Foreign Policy, 2014.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_mind_russia_geopolitics 
33 S. Secrieru. The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles for trust 
building (2009–2010), Journal Of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies, (Vol 11, Iss 3, 2011), 241-263. 
34 R. D. Asmus. A little war that shook the world: Georgia, Russia, and the future of the 
West, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 42. 
35 M. R. Freire & R. E. Kanet. Russia and Its Near Neighbours, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
43-44.  
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which Russia developed national interests in its neighboring states which directly conflict 
with the basic needs of those states’ survival, sovereignty and autonomy, in the 
international system and provides for the justification of Russia’s ‘paternal’ approach to 
these states. 
RUSSIAN LEVERS OF INFLUENCE IN THE BALTICS 
Russia’s increase in political, economic and military influence upon the Baltic 
states, coupled with its recently demonstrated willingness to intervene militarily in 
neighboring states which contain ethnic Russian populations, has created a credible threat 
that Russia will, at the least, interfere in their self-determination and, at worst, consider 
the use of military force to destabilize or even attempt to re-incorporate the Baltic states 
into the Russian Federation.  Russian influence is not an unexpected phenomenon in the 
Baltic states.  Their geographic position between Russia, its ally Belarus, the Baltic Sea 
and Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, means these neighboring states are unavoidable when it 
comes to Russia’s policies in its near abroad.  Under the leadership of Putin, however, 
Russia has become more aggressively involved in the internal affairs of the Baltic states 
than would be expected from the political and economic necessity of dealing with one’s 
neighbors.   
First, Russia has demonstrated a significant ability to influence the Russian 
populations of the Baltic states.  News from the Russian Federation in the Baltics is the 
primary Russian-language media which provides an extremely pro-Russian narrative to 
the ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltic states.  In addition, the penetration of Russian 
NGOs, Russophile-based political parties and “cultural centers” which demonstrate 
politically driven goals in line with the Russian state all grant Russia influence within the 
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Baltic States.36  Currently, the Baltic States have not developed significant Russian-
language media or political outreach programs to reach out to their own minority 
populations and provide opposing points of view, which has allowed the Russian 
government to greatly influence how these populations view the world and, significantly, 
their own situation.  Russia leverages these populations for its policy objectives and, 
dangerously, provides Russia the same point of access it has previously used in Ukraine 
and Georgia to cause internal instability and justification for intervention. 
Russian military exercises and actions have acted as thinly veiled threats to the 
Baltic states signaling that, should they stray too far from the influence of Russia, they 
would be especially vulnerable to outright military aggression.  Russian military 
movements, such as the ZAPAD maneuvers, are military exercises which, in 2009 and 
2013, were conducted as full-scale simulations explicitly aimed at fighting NATO and 
invading the Baltic states.37  These exercises provide a clear signal to the governments of 
the Baltic states that even their membership in NATO would not save them from an 
existential threat.  From 2013 to 2014 alone, Russian military maneuvers along Latvia’s 
borders increased fivefold, leading to more than 250 border incidents and performing 
exercises to simulate air and sea blockades of the Baltic region.38  These maneuvers serve 
as more than regular training for the maintenance of military forces but also to establish 
Russian power as the most imminent and influential military power in the region, which 
Russia uses to its advantage in the political arena when dealing with its neighbors.  It also 
demonstrates a credible threat to the Baltic states that there continues to exist the 
                                                 
36 G. Pridham. Time to bolster the Baltic states. The World Today, (Vol 71, Iss 4, 2015), 40-41. 
37 S. Blank. What do the Zapad 2013 exercises reveal (part two), Eurasia Daily Monitor, (Vol 10, Iss 180, 
2013). 
38 G. Pridham. Time to bolster the Baltic states. The World Today, (Vol 71, Iss 4, 2015), 40. 
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possibility of Russian forces being demonstrably capable of succeeding in an invasion, 
which provides a chilling backdrop to any diplomatic overtures the Russian government 
chooses to make. 
Aside from just military exercises, the Russian government has also taken more 
overt actions to make it clear to the Baltic states that Russia cannot be dismissed simply 
because of their membership within NATO or the European Union.  In 2015, Russian 
operatives abducted an Estonian intelligence officer from Estonian territory, charged him 
with espionage in Russia and sentenced him to 15 years in prison until Estonia agreed to 
a prisoner swap with its bullish neighbor.39  Russia also demonstrated its ability to flout 
international law when, in 2014, the Russian Coast Guard illegally boarded and detained 
a Lithuanian fishing vessel in international waters and impounded the vessel in Russian 
territory.40  In both instances, Russia was not held accountable for its violations of 
international law and was able to force concessions from the Baltic states.  Because of the 
Baltic states’ unwillingness to risk open conflict with their most powerful neighbor, and 
because Russia’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council prevents it from 
legally binding sanctions, Russia was able to use these incidents to remind the Baltic 
states of its supremacy within the region and to demonstrate its ability to violate these 
states’ sovereignty if it chooses to do so. 
Another significant concern of the Baltic states is their economic reliance upon 
Russia, especially considering Russia’s use of economic forces as a form of offensive 
                                                 
39 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Minister Calls for Release of 
Eston Kohver in Russia,” 2015.  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/minister-calls-for-release-of-eston-
kohver-in-russia 
40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. “Lithuanian Foreign Ministry 
issues diplomatic note to Russian Embassy over incidents in Lithuanian exclusive economic zone,” 2014. 
https://www.urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanian-foreign-ministry-issues-diplomatic-note-to-russian-embassy-
over-incidents-in-lithuanian-exclusive-economic-zone 
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statecraft.  The Baltic states still rely primarily upon Russia for oil and natural gas, which 
they worry could leave them vulnerable to the forms of economic blackmail suffered by 
Georgia and Ukraine during their recent conflicts with Russia.41  While their EU 
membership has made it possible for the Baltic states to wean themselves off of such 
dependency upon Russia, this has proven to be an almost unsolvable security dilemma.  
Russia has demonstrated that taking such actions will have consequences, but if they do 
not do so, then Russia will continue to maintain a significant capability to disrupt their 
economies if they stray too far from the desires of the Russian government.  This, again, 
places the Baltic states in the precarious position of determining if it is safest for them to 
improve their own security within the West or to submit to Russian dominance. 
Russian rhetoric has also become less amicable when it comes to the Baltic states.  
The Russian Foreign Ministry has stated it will “go as far as is needed [to protect] the 
interests of compatriots” in the Baltics, declared in contravention of its 1991 treaty with 
Lithuania that when the USSR absorbed the Baltic States it was congruent with 
international law, and has increasingly accused the Baltic states of breeding 
“Russophobia” and Nazism (the same claims it made as justification for intervention in 
Ukraine).42  Usually such blustery speech would be taken as political posturing, but 
Putin’s Russia has demonstrated a willingness to act upon such statements with force.  It 
has employed economic statecraft, cyber warfare, covert destabilization efforts and even 
the use of outright military force on the basis of such claims, leading to the political, 
economic and territorial destabilization of Georgia and Ukraine.  Its justification of the 
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right to protect Russians, regardless of the country they reside in, and the demonstrated 
use of force to do so is why Russia proves to be a credible threat to the Baltic states. 
While the Russian state itself could pose an existential threat to the Baltic states, it 
is the ethnic Russian populations within Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia through which 
Russia would most likely justify intervention or use to destabilize their states.  
Unfortunately, the current status of ethnic Russians within the Baltic states could be used 
by Russia to lend credence to possible military intervention or act as a breeding ground 
for stoking civil unrest.  While it would not be justified, such an intervention could use 
such a pretext and is an issue which the Baltic states need to address in order to safeguard 
their own security.  This is not, however, an easy problem to solve.  As we will see, the 
issues of identity and security are inextricably linked when it comes to the Russian 
minority populations within Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and demonstrate the absolute 
imperative of social integration, as opposed to marginalization, for both the domestic and 
international well-being of the Baltic states. 
THE ISSUE OF DOMESTIC BALTIC SECURITY 
The ethnic Russian populations in the Baltic states have faced an identity crisis 
since the breakup of the Soviet Union.  These populations transitioned from an ethnic 
majority in the USSR to existing as an ethnic minority in independent states whose 
existence is now predicated not on ideology but on ethnic identity.43  Under the USSR, 
the Baltic states witnessed an influx of ethnic Russians.  They never fully integrated, 
however, into Baltic society.  The nature of the Soviet system and its policies in the 
Baltics created animosity between ethnic Russians and the majority ethnic populations in 
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the newly independent Baltic states, with many Russians finding themselves in a new 
state through no fault of their own while the Baltic states held a great deal of animosity 
towards the Russians who experienced a privileged, urban life prior to the fall of the 
USSR.44  Prior to their independence, ethnic Russians held a privileged status within the 
Baltics, which meant that the dissolution of the USSR immediately left these populations 
with a sense of trepidation about what place they would occupy within the newly 
independent states.45  The majority did not speak the language of the Baltic states as the 
ethnic Russians tended to occupy relatively isolated, urban enclaves and were able to rely 
on Russian as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union.  Their identity, therefore, remained 
primarily based upon the ideology of the USSR and their Russian cultural roots. 
The Baltic states, upon independence from the Soviet Union, created their 
national identities based upon their majority ethnic identities, which resulted in 
establishing a cultural and political cordon sanitaire between ethnic Russians and the 
majority Baltic populations and governments.  The basis of ethnicity for their sovereignty 
resulted in the development of policies based upon shoring up those identities,46 such as 
establishing state language and citizenship based upon ethnic, as opposed to civic, 
identity.  These policy developments, however, led to disenfranchisement by minority 
populations.  For example, Latvian language requirements resulted in separate school 
systems for Latvian speakers and Russian speakers, creating a segregation of the two 
ethnic groups which would hold further ramifications when it comes to higher education 
and employment, so much so that almost a quarter of the Russian speaking population 
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believe their human rights are violated by the state’s policies.47  The establishment of 
state-languages is also particularly disadvantageous to their Russian populations, the 
majority of whom did not know their new state’s titular language.48   
Overall, language and ethnicity have led to significant educational and economic 
disparities between ethnic Russians and the state ethnic majorities, as it is more difficult 
for ethnic Russians to find work in the public sphere and, to a degree, within the private 
markets of their host states.49  Such policies also separate the level of self-determination 
among residents of the Baltic states.  Latvia and Estonia determined citizenship based 
upon ethnicity, as opposed to residency, which created a disparity in rights between them 
and their Russian minority populations not only in voting but even so far as to create 
‘stateless’ populations within their own borders.50  The inability of the Russian 
populations to participate in government beyond the local level significantly reduces their 
ability or even willingness to integrate or assimilate with the culture of their host nations. 
Despite these inequalities, however, ethnic Russians in the Baltics are not overly 
willing to return to Russia, either through immigration or reabsorption of their host 
nations by Russia.  Most of the Baltic states’ Russian populations are not entirely 
disenfranchised with their new nations.  It is important to make the distinction between 
their civic attachment, which is primarily with their new states, and their cultural 
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attachment, which remains with Russia.51  Even so, the Russian minorities make up 
significant portions of these states’ overall population, with Estonia and Latvia at 
approximately 28% and Lithuania at 9%.52  While certainly not representing the majority 
of Russians within the Baltic states, there is still a significant number of Russians who are 
discontented enough to be separatists and advocate for reunification with Russia itself.53  
This does not indicate, however, that there is a significant risk of organic political 
instability for the Baltic states as a result of their Russian populations.  There is a risk, 
however, of external influencers exacerbating the concerns of the ethnic Russian 
populations to create such instability. 
The primary concern is that it does not require a majority opinion among Baltic 
Russians to create a situation of unrest which would result in Russian intervention.  Vocal 
proponents of secession or irredentism among Russian and Baltic Russian elites would 
likely stir up fears among the minority Russian populations and lead to calls for 
intervention, which have historically been enough to precipitate action.54  As discussed 
earlier, Russia also dominates the market of Russian-language news and media even 
among the Baltic states, which provides it the ability to influence and shape the 
perceptions of these populations.  Combined with its demonstrated capability and 
willingness to further inflame such issues through the use of covert agents among 
Russian civilian populations in neighboring states, the result is that the Baltic states face a 
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realistic and credible threat that their ethnic minority groups may be manipulated as a tool 
of Russian foreign policy. 
In the past two decades, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly 
statist/nationalistic in nature.  Russian policies do not view Russians as simply its own 
citizens, but rather “define the Russian nation as a supranational people with a mission to 
consolidate former peoples of the USSR or Eurasia within a single multinational state”.55  
Furthermore, the manipulation of ethnic Russian minorities as a pretense for intervention 
by the Russian Federation is a tried and tested strategy and is a skill which Russia 
continues to hone.56  This use of the Russian diaspora as a pretext to intervention or 
outright invasion of neighboring countries is the reason why the Baltic states’ ethnic 
Russian populations pose a security concern for their host states. 
From the outset, Russian relations with its Baltic neighbors has had an ominous 
undertone.  To retain influence within the FSU, Russia was slow in recalling its military 
forces stationed within the new Baltic republics, and its disinterest in resettling ethnic 
Russians left behind made the Baltic states weary of their Russian-speaking population as 
potential vectors of Russian influence.57  Pre-dating Putin’s more nationalistic rhetoric, 
President Yeltsin directly pointed to the Baltic states’ treatment of their Russian 
minorities as the reason for delaying the withdrawal of Russian troops from Baltic bases 
in the early 1990s.58 Conversely, unequal treatment of Russian populations within the 
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Baltic states has left its mark on them, resulting in border disputes between Russia and 
the Baltic nations as recently as 2005.59  It is not simply that the Baltic states have 
Russian populations which puts them at risk of falling prey to Russian foreign policy and 
intervention, but rather that their policies create an environment where Russian claims for 
doing so could be, to a degree, demonstrably valid. 
The continuing narrative of Russian foreign policy is that it intervenes in its near 
abroad specifically to protect the lives and rights of the Russian people, and it does not 
always need to be predicated upon their citizenship.  President Putin justified military 
intervention in Ukraine because, he claimed, the crisis posed a “threat to the lives of 
Russian citizens.”60  In this way, President Putin used the ethnic Russian population in 
Ukraine as the absolute reason for Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea.  
Additionally, he made it clear that his justification was not entirely based upon the 
citizenship of those he claimed were in danger, but that it went beyond to extend 
protection to anyone belonging to the Russian family: “Frankly this is historically 
Russian territory and Russian people live there…They were in danger, and we cannot 
abandon them.”61  While the concept of the right to protect is still a controversial topic in 
the international community, especially because of the ramifications that it has upon the 
concept of states’ sovereignty, the Russian state has taken it even a step further and used 
the concept to justify incredible actions, to include the annexation of other states’ 
territories into itself.  This narrative provides a significant threat to Russia’s neighbors, 
most of whom retain at least some ethnic Russian minorities from the break-up of the 
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Soviet Union, but especially for the Baltic states whose ethnic Russian groups are 
marginalized and reside within geographic areas of strategic importance to Russia. 
The concept of Russia’s right to protect Russians with force, regardless of where 
they might be, is not contained just within the borders of the Russian Federation, either.  
Indeed, Russian-language media is carefully tailored to push Russia’s foreign policy 
narrative surrounding its actions in its near abroad, to the point that the majority of 
Russian speakers outside of Russia believe that the US was responsible for the color 
revolutions, that Georgia initiated the war with Russia in 2008 and that Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea was the right thing to do.62  By pushing this narrative beyond the 
borders of Russia to all ethnic Russian populations in its near abroad, Russia is able to set 
the stage for future interventions.  Even if the majority of ethnic Russians in the Baltics 
are not in favor of separatism, their current standing within society can lend credence to 
Russia’s justification for interfering in the internal politics of the Baltic states or even 
direct intervention.  Additionally, they would likely find a vocal minority within those 
populations which would support their actions.   
Ultimately, the stage is set for the possibility of Russia using force or at least to 
instigate instability in the Baltic states based upon its popular ideology of Russian 
nationalism.  Russia has demonstrated to the Baltic states its willingness and ability to do 
so with little to no repercussions from the international community, and even in the face 
of harsh international backlash it has revealed that Russia is willing to accept such a price 
in exchange for its reasserted dominance within its near abroad.  While the Baltic states 
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and their Russian minority populations are faced with a complex security/identity 
dilemma, its resolution is key to their future security and sovereignty. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC STATES 
The authors Gibler and Sewell have noted that, in the case of post-Soviet states, 
the involved interests of a regional power (i.e., Russia) have greatly influenced the degree 
to which these new states have been capable of resolving internal conflicts and adapted 
mechanics of government to prevent the resurgence of those conflicts, such as free 
democratic elections, participation in international organizations and alliances as well as 
adapting and adhering to human rights international law.63 Essentially, as the risk of 
Russian direct involvement or possibility of belligerence decreases within a post-Soviet 
state, it is more likely that the state will transition to less authoritarian-type governance 
and diplomacy and shift to democratic processes and arbitration to resolve internal 
conflicts.64 While NATO and EU expansion into Eastern Europe have decreased the 
pressure Russia is able to put upon some of these states, its ability to influence ethnic 
Russian populations provides for the possibility to instigate domestic instability in post-
Soviet states. 
Russian foreign policy in regard to the diaspora of ethnic Russians in the FSU 
creates significant security concerns for the Baltic states.  Regardless of the impetus, be it 
resurgent Russian nationalism, exploitation by the Russian government as a tool of 
realpolitik, irredentism or even cultural bias, the significantly large populations of ethnic 
Russians in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia pose security risks as vectors of Russian 
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influence.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states have worked to 
establish themselves as independent nations, primarily based upon ethnic national 
identity which has led to varying degrees of disenfranchisement among their Russian 
minorities.  As such, this allows for even the pretense of Russian intervention into the 
internal affairs of the Baltic states under the guise of its right to protect all Russians, 
regardless of citizenship.  To mitigate this threat, the Baltic states will need to approach 
the integration of their minority Russian populations as a primary policy concern. 
The results of the Baltic states’ relationships with their domestic Russian 
populations have significant impacts for NATO: it is of great concern that Washington 
wargames Russia’s exploitation of the Baltic’s large Russian minority population as a 
vector to challenge NATO’s resolve and that such scenarios, more often than not, turn out 
in Russia’s favor.65  However, while the solutions may appear simple in theory, the 
problem becomes almost intractable due to the security/identity puzzle posed by the 
Baltic states’ need to safeguard their own sovereignty and legitimacy while also figuring 
out how to integrate their ethnic Russian populations.66 
The most effective solution for the Baltic states would be to integrate their ethnic 
Russian minorities into their national identities.67  As such, they need to develop policies 
and reforms to provide true equality for their Russian populations.  Furthermore, the 
Baltic states need to shift from models of cultural assimilation, that is aiming for their 
Russian minorities to conform more to each state’s national identity, and more towards 
cultural integration, wherein both sides take on aspects of the other to form a more 
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unified national identity.68  Assimilation is unlikely to occur because the Russian 
populations are not isolated and unique to these states, but rather their cultural touchstone 
of Russia continues to exist in close proximity which reduces the likelihood that they 
would assimilate and adopt the cultures of their host states.  Similarly, they are unlikely 
to be willing to entirely shed their own culture unless forced to do so.  It is much more 
likely that the populations could integrate, but that would require them to both do so, 
such as by ending school segregation and instructing both the host-nation language and 
Russian in their schools. 
Current Baltic policies largely segregate and marginalize ethnic Russians, serve 
only to prevent the integration of these populations and leave them vulnerable to 
influence by the Russian government and its agents.  Full citizenship is an absolute 
necessity for the integration of Russian minorities into the Baltic states.  The Russian use 
of ‘passportization’ to increase its legitimacy in intervening on behalf of ethnic Russians 
in other states is much easier to justify if these populations are left ‘stateless.’69  
Additionally, the right to full participation in the civic government under which they live 
would significantly reduce animosity Baltic Russians may hold for their new states, as 
citizenship and voting rights are the two leading causes of Russian disenfranchisement 
within the Baltic states.70  Integration would be easier, and Russian intervention much 
more difficult, if the Baltic states take steps to rectify institutional marginalization of their 
ethnic Russian populations and make them equals within their respective societies.  
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Unfortunately, the current governments of the Baltic states do not have the political 
appetite to institute such reforms.   
 
  
 
 
28 
Chapter III:  The Status of Ethnic Russians in the Baltics 
Since the independence of the Baltic States from Russia, ethnic Russians living 
within Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have faced varying degrees of acceptance and 
integration into the societies of their adopted homelands.  Lithuania stands out, as it has 
largely integrated its ethnic Russian minority to create a multi-ethnic state.  In contrast, 
Latvia and Estonia have continually viewed their ethnic Russian populations negatively 
and, instead of striving to integrate their minority populations, have endeavored to either 
force assimilation or expel their ethnic Russian residents.71 
Russia has demonstrated a continued interest in the Baltic States ever since their 
independence and has taken threatening actions towards them.  It has demonstrated its 
ability to influence the ethnic Russian populations within those states, especially through 
its monopoly on Russian-language media.  Furthermore, Baltic security anxieties are 
exacerbated because the majority of their populations do not believe the US would honor 
its NATO commitments of offering military support in the event of Russian aggression, 
with Estonia the only state in which the population believes the US would by a paltry 
59% in 2017.72 
Despite ethnic Russians often living as second-class citizens, or even non-citizens, 
within the Baltic States, their attitudes towards their new homelands have remained 
generally more positive and favorable than their views about Russia.  Even after the 
Baltic States gained their independence, refused to grant the majority of ethnic Russians 
citizenship or significant political rights and with the safety-net of Soviet troops 
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completely withdrawing from the region in 1994, the ethnic Russians remaining in these 
new states viewed their governments and the value of residing in the Baltic nations more 
favorably than those of Russia.73  This does not mean that they do not hold any affinity 
for their ethnic homeland of Russia or that they do not take issue with their legal and 
social status within the Baltic States, because they do, but that the majority are not 
seeking secession or hoping for Russian irredentism.74  However, polling shows that, 
with an average of 77%75, the majority of ethnic Russians residing within the Baltic 
States do continue to view Russia favorably and agree that Russia has a responsibility to 
protect them, and similar numbers report that a strong Russia is necessary to balance the 
influence of the west76.  As a result of the actions and rhetoric of the Russian Federation 
as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the governments and citizens of the Baltic States 
remain wary of the threat posed by hosting large Russian minorities within their borders, 
and ethnic Russians living within the Baltic States face a degree of segregation, living in 
largely hermetic, concentrated populations in urban centers or on the border with 
Russia.77 
Since their independence from the Soviet Union, all three of the Baltic States have 
endeavored to establish themselves as ethno-national states whose identities and citizenry 
reflect their respective ethnic majorities, to the exclusion of ethnic minorities, which is 
reflected in their laws and governmental policies.  None recognize Russian as an official 
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language and, with the exception of Lithuania, the majority of ethnic Russians are either 
Russian citizens or stateless.78  This research has revealed that the security dilemma faced 
by the Baltic States hinges upon a real and persistent threat from Russia, the legitimate 
grievances of ethnic Russian populations within the Baltic States with regards to 
language and citizenship rights, and the insistence of the Estonian and Latvian 
governments that minorities must be assimilated into Baltic ethno-linguistic traditions 
while eschewing efforts at social integration.  Furthermore, it has revealed that the Baltic 
States have mixed records of improving social integration of their Russian minorities, but 
that they are receptive to improving their legal rights and statuses when incentivized to do 
so in order to participate in international institutions. 
Research into the official defense policies, language and citizenship laws, and the 
attitudes of ethnic Russians residing within the Baltic States reveals a stark difference 
between the degrees of integration and the nature of the threats posed by ethnic Russians 
to their states.  In Latvia and Lithuania, persistent policies of marginalizing ethnic 
Russians from public society and attempting to assimilate, rather than integrate, these 
populations have created a self-affirming security threat.  While Latvia and Lithuania 
pursue these policies out of fear that these populations pose a threat to their states, they 
are creating legitimate grievances which increase the resentment of these societies and 
allow Russia greater influence within these populations as it supports their efforts to gain 
rights.  As Russia’s influence increases with these populations, Latvia and Lithuania 
grow increasingly fearful of the possible threat ethnic Russians pose and pursue harsher 
measures to limit their influence in politics and society.  Lithuania, however, has a far 
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different threat system.  It has faced far greater success in integrating its ethnic Russian 
population into the social and political fabric of the state.  However, its government has 
persistently taken a bellicose stance towards Russia, both in policy and rhetoric, which 
has increased political opposition by its ethnic Russian population who do not hold such 
views towards their cultural homeland and sometimes feel that Lithuania’s fears and 
criticisms of the Russian state extend to them, allowing Russia to gain a degree of 
influence and control within the information space of both Lithuania’s ethnic Russian and 
Ethnic Polish minorities. 
LATVIA AND ESTONIA:  PURSUING ASSIMILATION, NOT INTEGRATION 
Latvia and Estonia, upon independence from the Soviet Union, have pursued 
strict policies of jus sanguinis in forming their new states, meaning that ethnic heritage is 
their primary concern for determining their laws and policies, especially in regard to the 
rules for citizenship and language.  As a result, they have actively suppressed the Russian 
language, prevented the majority of ethnic Russians from gaining citizenship and 
marginalized large swaths of their own societies. 
In pre-independent Latvia in 1990, the legislature instated “interwar citizenship,” 
which determined citizenship would be granted to those who had resided within the 
borders of Latvia prior to its occupation by foreign forces and their descendants, which 
excluded the majority of ethnic Russians living there.79  This allowed for an almost 
uniformly ethnic Latvian post-independence legislature to determine the laws governing 
the legal makeup of the new state, despite more than one third of its population was 
comprised of ethnic Russians and who today make up approximately one quarter of 
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Latvia’s current population.80 Currently, the majority of ethnic Russians in Latvia either 
hold Russian passports or “non-citizen” passports, which means they are resident aliens 
who do not actually hold citizenship in any state.81  Additionally, Latvia’s current 
language law, adopted by its parliament in 1999, recognizes Latvian as the sole official 
language of the state and is the required language for all government and public 
businesses, as well as all private businesses (to include the self-employed) “if their 
activities affect the lawful interests of the public (public security, health, morality, health 
care, protection of consumer rights and employment rights, safety in the work place and 
public administration supervision) (hereinafter also - lawful interests of the public) and to 
the extent that the necessary restriction which has been set in the lawful interests of the 
public is proportional to the rights and interests of private institutions, organisations and 
undertakings (companies)” and only exempts the undefined term of “unofficial” 
communications and religious activities. 82 
In Latvia, most politicians are opposed to the promotion or recognition of the 
Russian language.  The laws regarding the use of the Latvian language are enforced by 
the Latvian State Language Center, which often targets ethnic Russian government 
workers such as politicians and teachers.  For example, in 2016 this organization fined 
Riga’s mayor Nils Usakovs, an ethnic Russian speaker, multiple times for posting in 
                                                 
80 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. “Ethnic Composition and the Protection and 
Promotion of the Cultural Identity of National Minorities,” 15 Jan 2015. 
https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/integration-policy-in-latvia-a-multi-faceted-
approach/ethnic-structure-and-promotion-of-national-minorities-cultural-identity 
81 Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, Latvia. “Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā 
sastāva un valstiskās piederības,” (Trans. “Population of by ethnicity and nationality), 2016. 
https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/IRD2016/ISVN_Latvija_pec_TTB_VPD.pdf 
82 Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, “Valsts valodas likums,” (Trans. “Official Language Law”), 
Section 2, Articles 2-3, 21 December 1999. 
 
 
33 
Russian on social media accounts belonging to the Riga city government.83  In 2012, a 
referendum for a constitutional amendment to include Russian as an official state 
language was overwhelmingly rejected, in large part because most ethnic Russians in 
Latvia do not have citizenship and cannot vote, and its defeat was lauded by both the 
Latvian President and Prime Minister who claimed its passage would have endangered 
the Latvian Constitution and emphasized instead the need for ethnic Russians to learn 
Latvian.84  As late as 2018, Latvian President Raimonas Vejonis signed amendments to 
the state’s laws governing education specifically intended to end all Russian-language 
schooling, both public and private, and across all levels of instruction from kindergartens 
to universities, by 2021.85  The coordinated and systemic suppression of the Russian 
language is the result of Latvia’s insistence that its minority groups not be integrated, but 
assimilated into Latvian society both as a result of its desire to form an ethno-national 
state and out of fear of Russian influence through ethnic Russians in the state.  This is 
further borne out in its defense policies. 
After Latvia joined the European Union and NATO it began to regularly publish 
its defense strategy, known as National Security Concepts, which highlight the state’s 
national defense objectives, threats and policy responses as developed by its Ministry of 
Defence and ratified by the parliament.  The first two National Security Concepts, 
published in 2005 and 2008, primarily focused upon security objectives of integration 
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into the European Union and NATO8687, while dismissing that the Latvian state faced 
significant external threats.8889  In regards to internal security, both documents identify 
the need to pursue a higher level of integration of Latvia’s ethnic minorities and non-
citizens.  However, their policy prescriptions are focused on ensuring these population 
groups are assimilated into the Latvian ethno-linguistic identity.  The 2005 National 
Security Concept identifies the lack of Latvian language proficiency as the key hindrance 
to ethnic minorities integrating into society, and also prescribes that naturalization of new 
citizens, while needed, must be addressed “in the context of the Latvian ethno policy.”90  
Likewise, the 2008 National Security Concept highlights the need for increased social 
integration, to include using public education to emphasize Latvian history and language 
and as an avenue to encourage loyalty to the state.91  Furthermore, it continues the 
emphasis on the Latvian language from the previous National Security Concept as a way 
to unify public opinion, stating “The consistent consolidation of the Latvian language in 
all areas of public life and encouraging its use among the population is an important 
factor in reducing isolation of information spaces.”92  Later iterations of Latvia’s National 
Security Concept would become much more detailed in their analysis of threats and 
proposed solutions, but the theme of recognizing a split between ethnic Latvians and 
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ethnic minorities while prescribing the use of the Latvian language as its solution will 
remain consistent. 
Latvia’s 2011 National Security Concept identified the lack of social and 
linguistic integration of its minorities as a significant security threat, as it could lead to 
splitting of the society and resulting in two different “information spaces” in which not 
all of society is integrated into values of state loyalty or pro-Latvian/EU ideals.93  To 
counter this issue, it proposes to limit foreign aid to NGOs which support minority 
interests and become itself the primary source of support for such agencies, to increase 
efforts at indoctrinating patriotic and pro-Latvian values in school children, and to 
increase resources to shift consumption of media by ethnic majorities to Latvian-
language sources.94  Finally, this document proposes that, beginning in the 1st grade, 
schools will begin instructing school children to gain knowledge of European Union 
languages to facilitate ties to Europe95, which excludes the Russian language as it is not 
an official language in this international institution.  This document, while never 
specifically speaking directly about the Russian minority, specifically targets Latvia’s 
problem of integrating them into society.  Despite using the term “integration,” these 
policies reflect Latvia’s persistent efforts to have the ethnic Russian minority assimilate.  
If the Latvian state limited foreign aid to NGOs which support ethnic Russians’ interests 
and became the primary source of such support, it would be able to significantly limit 
those which it finds threatening to its assimilation endeavors.  The efforts of this National 
Security Concept do not address the primary grievances of ethnic Russians as the reasons 
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for which they pose a threat to the Latvian state, but rather external (i.e., Russian) sources 
of media and funds. 
Latvia’s most recent National Security Concept published in 2016 states that the 
promotion of the status of the Russian language sews disunity within its society96 and 
poses their internal solution as focusing on a national language policy in which 
instruction of the Latvian language takes precedence for both ethnic Latvian citizens and 
Latvia’s minority groups alike.97  In this Security Concept, the Latvian parliament 
acknowledges that public media consumption must be considered an aspect of national 
security and recognizes that its Russian minority strongly prefers to consume media in 
the Russian language, which mostly comes from the Russian Federation and promotes 
pro-Russian ideals and degrades the value Western institutions such as NATO and the 
European Union.  However, the strategy it proposes to address this issue emphasizes that 
Latvia continues to pursue a policy of assimilation, rather than integration, of its ethnic 
Russian population.  The 2016 National Security Concept advocates to establish a 
regulatory framework which would allow Latvia to block access to foreign-based media 
sources which “disseminate information that juxtaposes the interests of the Republic of 
Latvia within the territory of Latvia” and to replace them by providing more access to 
commercial and cable television from Western Europe. 98  This plan, and the previous 
Latvian security documents evaluated in this research, demonstrates the continued 
unwillingness of the Latvian state to deviate from its policy of assimilating its ethnic 
Russian minority.  Furthermore, because of its dedication to refrain from taking any 
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actions which would appear to legitimize the use of the Russian language in society, 
Latvia continues to be disadvantaged in its ability to counter Russian disinformation 
campaigns which specifically target the Russian-speaking audience within its own 
borders as it pursues policies which avidly avoid engaging them in their own language. 
In lockstep with Latvia, Estonia similarly altered its citizenship laws pre-
independence in 1989 based on interwar residence/heritage, to the exclusion of its ethnic 
Russians who made up and continue to be approximately one third of the nation’s 
population, which resulted in a uniformly ethnic Estonian legislature in post-
independence Estonia determining the laws of the new state.99  Estonia’s suppression of 
the Russian language has long-term negative effects upon its ethnic Russian population.  
For example, with Estonian as the only official language of the state, ethnic Russians are 
uniquely disadvantaged in the educational system.  There is only one university in 
Estonia which instructs in the Russian language, a privately funded institution in Tallinn, 
and only 13% of the Russian-speaking population attends university in the country.100 
In 1995, the European Union insisted that Estonia would have to improve its 
citizenship policies to reduce the number of its “stateless” persons as a precondition to 
membership, and after 9 years the Estonian government became a member by altering its 
naturalization laws to allow for legal residents to become citizens after living in the 
country for 5 years, but with additional requirements such as language and history 
proficiencies which hinder ethnic Russians from attaining citizenship.101  Currently, of 
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the ethnic Russians living in Estonia, approximately one third hold citizenship in Estonia, 
once third hold Russian passports, and one third hold resident alien, or “gray,” passports 
which grants them “special legal status” but not citizenship of any state, thereby skirting 
the EU’s requirements to reduce its numbers of “stateless” peoples.102 
Estonia consistently pursues language policies aimed at promoting the use of the 
Estonian language and to prevent the use of the Russian language.  In 1997, the Estonian 
government voted to restrict high school education taught in languages other than 
Estonian, requiring 60 percent of studies to be taught in Estonian and 40 percent in 
another language, and the Estonian government is also able to prevent schools from 
choosing Russian as the minority language of instruction as educational institutions’ 
choice is subject to approval by the government.103  The Estonian Language Inspectorate, 
a government office, enforces the use and proficiency of the Estonian language for all 
government employees, from clerks and bus drivers to political offices and teachers, and 
can fine or terminate employees for not maintaining an adequate mastery of the language, 
including teachers who instruct in Russian-language schools.104  In 2007, with tensions 
already high due to the controversial moving of a Soviet-era statue in Estonia, Russian 
language media began to vocally condemn the Inspectorate for its penchant of firing 
ethnic Russian teachers after failing surprise spot checks.105   
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The Estonian Language Inspectorate has become a significant point of contention 
for ethnic Russians in Estonia, and one which Russian media is quick to highlight as a 
significant aspect of institutional discrimination against ethnic Russians, such as in 2011 
when the Inspectorate fired five orphanage workers in the city of Narva for not speaking 
proficient enough Estonian, despite the fact that 97% of the population of Narva speaks 
Russian.106  Furthermore, resentment and angry protests by ethnic Russians significantly 
increased in 2016 when Estonia shuttered its remaining Russian-language newspapers.107  
The Russian language, except in strictly private communication, is systematically and 
systemically suppressed within the state of Estonia. 
Additionally, non-citizens residing in Estonia, the majority of which are ethnic 
Russians, are politically marginalized.  While they may vote in local elections, they face 
legal restrictions from voting in national elections or attaining political offices, 
organizing political parties at the national level, and non-citizens face heavy restrictions 
from serving in civil services, the military, or police.108  As a result, Russia gained 
political capital to criticize the Estonian state for its treatment of Russian and increased 
its popularity and influence with Estonia’s ethnic Russians.   In 2007, the Estonian 
government chose to move a Soviet-era statue of a soldier to a more secluded area, which 
resulted in violent protests from ethnic Russians residing in the nation and three weeks of 
concerted cyber-attacks from Russia on the infrastructure of the state.109  Additionally, 
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research conducted by academics and American news agencies in 2015 revealed “the 
divide between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians was more keenly felt in the 
aftermath of the Ukraine conflict than before” and “data reflects generally more critical 
views of the Estonian government, of NATO, and of the United States on the part of the 
Russian minority population,” and that these feelings coincided with a general upswell in 
criticism by ethnic Russians of Estonia’s policies towards Russian language schools and 
“stateless” Russians who did not hold Russian citizenship but were not Estonian citizens 
because they could not pass the language tests.110 
Estonia’s history of anti-Russian policies is also reflected in its national security 
policies, which regularly emphasize the need for society to be cohesive through the 
assimilation of its ethnic minorities, especially through the uniform promotion of the 
Estonian language and Western values.  In its initial National Security Concept, Estonia 
viewed its security situation as predominantly concerning terrorism and crime, with and 
viewed the possibility of military conflicts as almost non-existent, stating: 
“The probability of a military conflict breaking out, that would 
encompass all of Europe, or the threat of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region 
has been reduced to a minimum. Membership in NATO and the EU 
reduces the threat of war for Estonia even more. Estonia’s national 
security is neither presently, nor will be in the near future, confronted with 
a direct military threat.”111 
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This Concept further notes that a top priority for Estonia’s internal security is the 
consolidation of the rule of law and integration of society.  As such, it places paramount 
importance upon its Integration Policy aimed at unifying its society into a singular entity 
based upon two principles: knowledge of the Estonian language and the acquisition of 
Estonian citizenship.112  It is notable that even in its earliest public National Security 
Concept, Estonia views its domestic security as based on assimilation, rather than 
integration, of its ethnic minorities which include a third of its population, the majority of 
whom do not hold Estonian citizenship or fluency in the Estonian language. 
 In its 2010 National Security Concept, Estonia elaborates on the threat that its 
largely un-integrated minorities pose to its internal stability.  It re-states that its 
integration processes are vital to maintaining Estonia’s security, and highlights “poorly 
adapting social groups” as a threat.113  This National Security Concept also emphasizes 
its prescriptions to integrate its ethnic minorities by shaping them into Estonian society 
based upon Estonian values and identity through stronger enforcement of its language 
policies and education, and to gain stronger support for its Integration Policy from local 
governments, state authorities and civil society organizations.114 
 Finally, in its 2017 National Security Concept, Estonia recognizes Russia as its 
most significant security threat as a result of its desired influence in the Baltics, its 
aggressive activities in Ukraine, and repeated aggressive and provocative activities 
directed at Estonia.115  In acknowledging the risk posed by Russian information 
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operations, this National Security Concept dedicates an entire chapter to societal 
cohesion, specifically prescribing the need for all segments of its population to better 
understand the Estonian language and using strategic messaging to counter “excessively 
divergent views and unbalanced criticism.”116  The intent of such policies are to better 
unify the whole of Estonian society into its ethno-national values and provide for  
“psychological defence” from opposing narratives which criticize or otherwise 
undermine Estonian institutions and legitimacy.117 
 Ultimately, both Estonia and Latvia face a significant security problem regarding 
their large, ethnic Russian minorities.  Through jus sanguinis policies of citizenship and 
language laws, ethnic Russians have been significantly marginalized from society.  The 
legitimate threat of provocations from Russia has only exacerbated the anxieties held by 
the governments of Latvia and Estonia, leading them to take harsher measures to prevent 
ethnic Russians from gaining influence in society unless they become assimilated into the 
ethno-national culture.  These measures, however, simply increase the risk that Russia 
will gain influence and popularity with these populations and use them as a vector to 
destabilize these NATO member states. 
LITHUANIA: MAINTAINING A WELL-INTEGRATED BUT ‘OTHER’ RUSSIAN MINORITY 
Unlike Latvia or Estonia, Lithuania has made successful efforts to integrate its 
ethnic Russian minority into society.  Lithuania retained its universal citizenship laws 
established in 1989, which lacked any ethnic requirements, when it held its first post-
independence elections in 1990, but its subsequent legislature was composed almost 
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entirely of Lithuanians who altered the citizenship laws in 1991 to grant preferential 
treatment to those “of Lithuanian descent.”118  This is not surprising given that, at the 
time of independence to the present day, Lithuania maintained and maintains the smallest 
percentage of ethnic Russians among the Baltic States, vacillating between 5-10% of the 
national population.119  The majority of ethnic Russians in Lithuania do have citizenship 
as Lithuania implemented a jus soli principle, that is anyone born within the country gets 
citizenship, in stark contrast to the jus sanguinis, or “right of blood,” principles used by 
Latvia and Estonia.120  In fact, Lithuania has been the most successful of the Baltic States 
in integrating its ethnic Russian minority.  The ethnic Russians in Lithuania are free to 
attend schools in the Russian language at all levels of education, they have little trouble 
gaining citizenship, and even their self-reporting of ever experiencing discrimination 
based on their minority status as polled in 2008 is quite low at 12%, as opposed to the 
Latvia and Estonia where reporting revealed 25% and 55% respectively.121 
One reason why ethnic Russians in Lithuania do not pose a significant security 
threat to their state is because the state does not treat them as a threat.  This is in part due 
to the relatively small percentage of the population made up of ethnic Russians in 
comparison to the other Baltic States, leading Lithuanians to not view them as influential 
or threatening.122 Since its independence from the Soviet Union, Russians have been 
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consistently treated by the government as equal citizens, despite Lithuanian serving as the 
sole official language of the state the language laws since 1995 made significant 
concessions to ethnic minorities allowing them to preserve their language and culture, 
and the resulting integration of its Russian citizens fostered strong bonds to the state 
which significantly hampers Russian information operations’ effectiveness in sewing 
dissent. 
In 1995 the Lithuanian Seimas (the Lithuanian parliament) passed “The Law on 
the State Language”, which determined when, where and how to enforce the use of 
Lithuanian as the sole official language and also established the State Lithuanian 
Language Commission to further clarify rules and act as an enforcement mechanism for 
the state123 which, despite adhering to the principle desires of the Lithuanians to ensure 
the existence of their state based on an ethno-national model, makes significant 
concessions to ethnic minority groups so that they might retain their languages while still 
integrating into the greater Lithuanian society as a whole.  The concluding sentence in 
Article 1 of this law states, “Other laws of the Republic of Lithuania and legal acts 
adopted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall guarantee the right of persons, 
belonging to ethnic communities, to foster their language, culture and customs.”124  
While there are many similarities to the language laws of Estonia and Latvia, such as 
requiring Lithuanian to be the language of instruction in education and delineates 
proficiencies required for all state employees, it also guarantees instruction to learn 
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Lithuanian and specifically exempts “teaching and special programs and 
events…intended for ethnic communities.”125 
Despite the deep integration of ethnic Russians into Lithuanian society, the 
government does still view them as a potential threat because of Russia’s influence.  
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Lithuanian President Dalia 
Grybauskaite stated that Russia was a “terrorist state,” alarming ethnic Russians,126 and 
that she would attempt to significantly limit Russian television broadcasts in Lithuania,127 
despite the country not having any domestic Russian-language television media.  She 
followed through severe restrictions and cutting off access to Russian-language television 
and radio for periods of time, although at the risk of raising complaints regarding 
freedom of speech rights by Lithuania’s ethnic Russians.128  As concerns mount 
regarding Russia’s actions, the ethnic Russians in Lithuania are increasingly viewed with 
suspicion.  In 2015 Waldemar Tomaszewski, the leader of Electoral Action of Poles in 
Lithuania which serves as the political party for Polish minority in Lithuania, began to 
court ethnic Russians for support which led to an increase in Lithuanian suspicions of 
ethnic Poles because of their association with the ethnic Russian minority.129  In the same 
year, the fact that Lithuania’s ethnic Russians still hold strong cultural ties to Russia 
became clear when the government of Vilnius decided to remove four Soviet-era statues 
in the city, drawing harsh criticism from the Russian minority and eliciting condemnation 
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from Larisa Dmitriyeva, who was a member of the Lithuanian parliament and one of the 
leaders of the ethnicity-based political party Lithuanian Union of Russians.130 
In Lithuania’s 2006 Annual Strategic Review, the government identifies 
Lithuanian “strategic culture” as one in which, since its independence from the Soviet 
Union, “the Lithuanian perception of ‘we’ clearly encompassed Western civilization and 
values, while Eastern neighbors were perceived as ‘they.’”131  This concept is borne out 
in successive Lithuanian security policies, which consistently use the threat of Russian 
aggression as a way to unify domestic policy and identity, even though it raises ire among 
its ethnic Russian population who still have strong ties to their cultural homeland and can 
feel that they are included in the state’s anti-Russian rhetoric.  As the 2006 Annual 
Strategic Review states: 
 “At the very beginning of the process of nation-state building, Lithuania 
like many other newly emerged or transition countries, employed the 
model of the so called “conflict ethnic conduct,” which consisted of 
utilizing the image of the outside enemy for domestic consolidation and 
attracting political attention and economic assistance of the countries of a 
“democratic core.” It is not surprising, that it is the former metropolis 
which was selected for this role. As far as the Lithuanian statehood was 
strengthening, this mobilizing mechanism was gradually losing its 
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importance. But even now Russia continues to stay a significant “other” or 
a negative point of reference.”132 
This viewpoint of Russia as the “other” persists in both Lithuanian state rhetoric and 
policy, and to a degree marginalizes ethnic Russians who do not hold this same viewpoint 
and can feel that such criticism of Russia likewise applies to them. 
 The Lithuanian 2012 National Security Strategy, while not explicitly naming 
Russia, recognizes internal social discord as a potential threat to national security, and its 
policy prescriptions to prevent such discord is to cultivate “civic awareness and 
patriotism.”133  To do so, this strategy policy directs that Lithuania will make civic 
awareness and patriotism compulsory aspects of the education system134 and to promote 
the use of the Lithuanian language while implementing public information policy 
measures aimed at preventing the negative effects of information “directed against the 
State and its citizens.”135  While this policy document not specifically name Russia, its 
prescriptions make clear that concerns regarding internal security are based upon the 
heterogenous cultural makeup of its society.  After the Russian annexation of Crimea, 
however, the Lithuanian National Security Strategy would drastically change, raising the 
alarm of Russia’s aggression and the threat posed by its ethnic Russian minority.   
 In its 2017 National Security Strategy, the Russian Federation is identified as the 
paramount security threat to the Lithuanian state.136  Recognizing the threat posed by 
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Russian information operations, this security strategy highlights the need for Lithuania to 
pursue legal avenues to prevent the dissemination of information it deems poses a threat 
to its “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence,”137 and to make an 
effort to bring ethnic Russians more in line with the political values of the Lithuanian 
state, as it implies the regions which are predominantly composed of ethnic Russians are 
areas in which “active citizenship is weaker.”138  This view of ethnic Russians residing, to 
a degree, within a separate space from the majority of Lithuanians and being susceptible 
to Russian information operations was made explicit in the previous year’s National 
Threat Assessment. 
The Lithuanian 2016 National Threat Assessment identified the Russian-language 
education systems and communities as a significant vector for Russian influence 
operations.139 In particular, it describes ethnic Russian communities and schools as a 
“closed” network in which Russia, through its embassy in Vilnius and several Russian-
funded NGOs is able to promote Russia’s interests in the community, foster Russian 
compatriot sentiments and anti-Western notions, and that such activities bleed over into 
Lithuania’s Polish minority population in which “a substantial proportion of this 
community lives in the Russian cultural and information field, which constantly incites 
anti-Lithuanian hostility and mistrust of the ethnic communities through disinformation 
and propaganda.”140  To a degree, this notion of ethnic Russians as living apart from the 
greater Lithuanian community has given rise to some inter-ethnic anxieties.  Polling in 
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2017 indicates that more than two thirds of Lithuanians believe that their society would 
be better if it was homogenous in religion, culture and ethnicity.141  
Finally, in its 2019 National Threat Assessment, Lithuania again acknowledges 
that Russia actively engages in disinformation and propaganda efforts, especially through 
social media, to foment discontent among the Lithuanian population, with a particular 
emphasis upon alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speakers and by exacerbating 
inter-ethnic tensions.142  Despite how well Lithuania has integrated its ethnic Russian 
minority, there remains a degree of inter-ethnic tensions within its society.  Russians 
continue to hold pro-Russian cultural attachments and sentiments, which increases their 
sense of societal marginalization when the Lithuanian state engages in anti-Russian 
rhetoric or pursues anti-Russian policies.  Furthermore, while Latvian Russians are 
exceedingly unlikely to actively work against the interests of their state and are actively 
engaged in all levels of its political processes, the lack of the Latvian state’s engagement 
with this group in the Russian language leaves them especially vulnerable to Russian 
influence. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RESEARCH 
 Despite the comparatively high standard of living in the Baltic States, their ethnic 
Russian minorities have legitimate grievances which can be leveraged by the Russian 
Federation to threaten their security.  The defense policies of the Baltic States focus on 
Russia as their greatest security threat, which bleeds over into social perceptions of the 
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unintegrated Russian minorities.  This is exacerbated by historical grievances of the 
ethnic Baltic groups towards Russia. 
 Historically, the Baltic States have improved the status and rights of ethnic 
Russians minorities when required to do so in exchange for membership to highly 
beneficial international institutions, such as the European Union.  As noted in this 
chapter, all of the Baltic States made improvements to their citizenship laws when the 
European Union made it a requirement for membership.  However, the European Union’s 
efforts at the time were to remedy the risk of “stateless” residents and thus focused on 
persuading the Baltic States to move away from their models based on interwar residence 
and descent, which they did, but did not raise qualms about Baltic policies which heavily 
favored citizenship based on ethnicity.143 
 Additionally, the security situation is markedly different for Lithuania than it is 
for Latvia and Estonia.  While Lithuania’s ethnic Russians are deeply integrated at most 
levels of society, its bellicose rhetoric and policies risk raising the ire of its ethnic 
Russian minority which retains strong cultural ties to the Russian Federation.  Estonia 
and Latvia, however, seem to be trapped in a downward spiraling relationship with their 
ethnic Russian minorities, who are largely marginalized from society, especially 
susceptible to Russian influence as a result, and the increasing threat posed by Russia 
both from its actions and its increasing influence only encourages Estonia and Latvia to 
more strictly treat its Russian residents in a vicious cycle. 
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According to Matthew Rojansky, the Director of the Kennan Institute at the 
Wilson Center, in testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in 2017: 
“A crisis is still very possible in any one of the Baltic States. The sensitive 
disputes over local language tests for full citizenship, and Russian language in 
schools, the press, and even social media could escalate relatively quickly and 
easily in case of a triggering event. Such an event, whether real or staged, could 
involve an alleged hate crime against Russian speakers, closure of a private 
Russian language organization or publication, or even allegations of election 
fraud.”144  
In this context, what is the US able to do from a policy perspective to prevent such a 
crisis from ever manifesting within its Baltic allies? 
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Chapter IV:  Conclusion and Policy Options for the United States 
The United States has limited policy options to resolve the threat posed by 
Russia’s ability to the domestic Russian populations of the Baltic States.  The majority of 
actions taken by the United States and NATO to address Baltic security concerns have 
been intended to provide reassurance and deterrence but fall short of prevention, 
especially in the context of Russia’s ability to exploit ethnic population as a vector to 
destabilize neighboring states.145  However, the United States is uniquely capable to assist 
in these security needs by improving Baltic civic integration and security through its 
influence in international institutions, grassroots diplomacy, and information operations.  
First, the United States can use its significant influence in Western institutions, such as 
NATO, to incentivize the Baltic States to adopt policies which both directly and 
indirectly improve the civic rights of ethnic Russians and improve their integration with 
the ethnic Baltic populations such as by encouraging these states to adopt the Israeli 
model of universal conscription.  Second, while the domestic nature of the security issues 
posed by ethnic Russian in the Baltics precludes the effective use of direct diplomatic 
means, the US State Department could use grassroots efforts to encourage societal 
integration at a young age by promoting and funding the growth of English-language 
secondary schools fostering both the use of English as a neutral language and inter-ethnic 
personal relationships in formative age-groups.  Finally, the US could revive US State 
Department information operations programs to counter Russian disinformation, such as 
increasing Russian-language media in the Baltic States to provide sources of news and 
entertainment to ethnic Russians. 
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INCENTIVIZATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The US maintains significant influence within and through international 
institutions and alliances to indirectly incentivize the Baltic States to take actions which 
would both improve their security, deter possible Russian aggression, provide 
reassurance, and significantly remedy both the perceptions and realities of the threat 
posed by ethnic Russians within the Baltic States.  The US should encourage Estonia and 
Latvia to pursue the conscription model of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which serves 
as a tool of integration for society.  Additionally, the United States should spend 
diplomatic capital to persuade the European Union (EU) to increase its standards for 
member states to recognize significant ethnic languages as official languages and to 
reduce the numbers of stateless residents through more relaxed naturalization processes.   
Enacting universal conscription based on the Israeli model would simultaneously 
improve societal integration and reduce the risk posed by Russia to the Baltic States but 
runs counter to the current trends of NATO states.  Since the end of the Cold War, both 
the EU and NATO have been steadily phasing out the use of conscription in favor of 
professional military forces, and both Latvia and Lithuania abandoned conscription in 
2008 in order to model themselves on NATO’s preferred expeditionary model for armed 
forces146.  Only 5 of the 28 NATO member states continue to use conscription as well as 
only 6 of the 27 EU states147, although Sweden has reinstituted conscription in direct 
reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Baltics.148  Furthermore, while both 
Estonia and Lithuania currently mandate conscription, Estonia will only conscript 
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Russians who are citizens and its mandatory service is easy to avoid, with only 
approximately one third of eligible men actually passing through their conscription 
service.149  However, transitioning to conscription services based on the Israeli model 
would serve multiple benefits to Estonia and Latvia, including increased integration of 
their ethnic Russian populations into society and providing the Baltic States with a 
stronger deterrence posture by vastly increasing the number of trained, inactive reserve 
forces which can be called to service in times of crisis.  Estonia even officially recognizes 
that conscription serves to better integrate ethnic Russians into society,150 although under 
its current practices this does not occur.  
The Israeli model of conscription would be a viable measure to not only improve 
the security standing of the Baltic States, but to better integrate the ethnic Russians into 
Baltic societies.  Arab Druze lobbied the Israeli government to be included in the military 
draft in order to better gain acceptance and integration in Israeli society and the 
government, in turn, acquiesced while resolving its own security concerns with 
incorporating non-Jews by designating Arab Druze to serve in non-combat units.151  
Promoting such a practice in the Baltic States, including the allowance to differentiate 
assigned roles in the military based on security concerns, could serve to better integrate 
ethnic Russians with Baltic citizens.  In Estonia, despite the limited degree to which it 
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occurs, such practices are yielding positive results.152  Additionally, the ability to 
differentiate roles of conscripts for ethnic Russians could make this policy more 
politically viable to the policy-makers of the Baltic States. 
NATO research has demonstrated that inter-ethnic military conscription has 
significant impacts in shaping the attitudes of young recruits, who are most often in the 
highly formative age continuum of 17-20 years, to be more accepting and understanding 
of their peers from other ethnic groups.153  Furthermore, this research suggests that 
military conscription including mixed ethnic identities contributes significantly to the 
formation of a more cohesive, national identity which exceeds ethno-national 
identities.154  If NATO supported the Baltic States in returning to/enhancing military 
conscription services, not only would their tangible security posture improve, it would 
pay societal dividends in the long run by better integrating ethnic Russian populations 
into a greater, national identity.  It would likely also boost the confidence of the Baltic 
States that Russia would not attempt military action against them, the threat of which 
enhances anti-Russian sentiments and is exacerbated by the very low confidence that the 
Baltic States hold that NATO would provide military support against Russian 
aggression.155 
Another way in which the United States could used international institutions to 
influence the Baltic States is through European Union standards and practices.  
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Historically, the legal and political status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States improves 
when the states are incentivized or pressured by requirements of the European Union.  
Improvements in the legal and political rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States 
periodically occurred whenever their governments found it necessary in order to accede 
to NATO, the European Union and other significant international institutions.156  As the 
Baltic States are already members of NATO, the United States would find it difficult, and 
likely unproductive, to use it as an avenue of approach for this policy.  In the EU, 
however, the Baltic States find their domestic laws and policies are often subject to the 
rules and standards of the supranational organization.  As such, the EU is the most 
appropriate vehicle through which simultaneous incentives and pressures might be placed 
upon Baltic States in order to affect changes to improve the language rights, citizenship 
statuses and quality of life for ethnic Russians residing in the Baltic States.  As such, the 
United States should pursue an aggressive, diplomatic effort to persuade the European 
Union, and especially its most influential members, to pursue additional rules and 
requirements in which member states be pressured to further recognize minority 
languages as additional official languages and to pursue less ethno-centric citizenship 
standards in order to better integrate their minority populations and reduce the number of 
“stateless” residents. 
There are multiple benefits from pursuing such a policy.  First, by improving the 
rights of ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Russian Federation loses the 
ability to use the dangerous rhetoric of justification for intervention in order to protect 
disenfranchised Russian populations in its near abroad.  Second, the improvement of 
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rights, privileges and general standards of living will bolster the desire of ethnic Russians 
to continue living in and supporting their adopted homeland which stand in stark contrast 
to the same criteria in the Russian Federation.  Finally, because the Baltic States are 
members of EU, they are especially subject to its rule-making authority.  While their 
governments would likely bristle at direct diplomatic pressure from the United States to 
pursue these domestic policies, they would feel pressured and obliged to pursue them if 
dictated by the European Union. 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOOLS AS VECTORS FOR INTEGRATION 
 As previously noted, social interaction between members of differing ethnic 
groups during formative ages are an essential aspect of promoting societal, inter-ethnic 
integration.157  In the Baltic States, however, there exists de facto segregation within 
secondary school education because of language differences which is exacerbated by the 
focus of the Baltic governments in promoting national identity on the basis of using the 
native Baltic languages as their state lingua franca.  Instead of forming a cohesive and 
shared national identity, however, these actions increase inter-ethnic tensions and 
divisions and foster ethno-linguistic rivalry.  While the United States would likely 
antagonize the Baltic States by directly pressuring them to pursue different domestic 
policies, it could pursue these policies through grassroots diplomacy.  As such, the US 
State Department should start a development program aimed at constructing and 
operating public secondary schools in Baltic urban centers in which English is the 
language of instruction.  The benefits of such a policy would be to provide highly 
desirable education to student bodies which are not ethno-linguistically segregated to 
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promote societal integration during formative ages.  Furthermore, the use of English as a 
neutral language of communication would have the added benefit in the long term of 
alleviating the tensions produced by ethno-linguistic loyalties. 
The English language has the capability to serve an important role in the 
integration of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual societies.  Researchers have shown alumni from 
secondary schools which maintained de facto segregation due to ethno-linguistic 
differences maintained far less ethnically diverse social networks from those which 
attended integrated schools, even long after having left the educational system158.  Not 
only does English serve as the world’s current lingua franca, making English-speaking 
skills highly valuable for education and commerce, it can simultaneously act as a 
perceptually “neutral” language in non-English speaking societies and as a tool to remedy 
de facto segregation.  In relatively new states which contain diverse ethnic and linguistic 
communities, such as the Baltic States, there exists the inherent “conflict between loyalty 
to one’s ethnic community and loyalty to the wider national community.”159  In the case 
of Singapore, researchers found that the use of English as the predominantly instructed 
language and as the most popular working language has fostered not only inter-ethnic 
communications but directly influenced the early development of a “supra-ethnic 
Singapore identity.”160  While the United States can do little to directly influence the 
Baltic governments to follow the Singapore model or even to mandate all schools and 
universities use English as the language of instruction, it could support and fund 
initiatives to build public secondary schools in the Baltic States which instruct only in 
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English with the purpose of not only providing an invaluable skill to students but to allow 
ethnic Russian and ethnic Baltic students to study together and foster inter-ethnic 
socialization. 
This policy would yield multiple benefits for the security of the Baltic States.  As 
previously noted from the research into integration of the Israeli Defense Forces, the 
success of inter-ethnic integration in mixed societies is highly dependent upon close and 
sustained personal interactions during the formative years of youth and young 
adulthood.161  Such integration would help to diminish the negative impact of Baltic 
assimilation policies.  Additionally, close interaction between ethnic groups will diminish 
distrust and fears between the populations, reducing the appeal for the governments to 
implement discriminatory policies.  Finally, the relief of societal tensions may result, in 
the long term, in the Baltic governments pursuing policy changes which prevent Russia 
from using claims of institutional discrimination against ethnic Russians as a reason for 
interference. 
The operation of public secondary schools with English as the language of 
instruction would circumvent de facto segregation based on ethno-linguistic lines and 
allow both ethnic Russians and ethnic Baltic students to closely interact with each other 
on a daily basis during the crucial window in which identity is still forming, allowing for 
a more cohesive and inclusive national identity in the long-term.  By changing such 
attitudes, future Baltic leaders might be more willing to pursue inclusive policies such as 
full citizenship for ethnic Russians, the recognition of Russian as an official language, 
and alleviating some of the negative perceptions towards ethnic Russians.  Additionally, 
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this integration policy could allow more ethnic Russians to view themselves as members 
within Baltic society, increasing their incentive to support the Baltic States and 
incorporate them into a supra-ethnic national identity.   
REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The United States must revive Russian language information operations to 
counter Russian influence in its near abroad.  As the research in the previous chapter 
noted, Latvia and Estonia have actively suppressed the domestic development of Russian-
language media and none of the Baltic States have demonstrated willingness to engage 
with or counter Russian information operations through the Russian language itself.  
Additionally, traditional media, such as radio and television broadcasts, are no longer 
sufficient to counter Russian influence in the digital sphere which increasingly includes 
social media, where active engagement and persistent involvement are necessary to 
counter Russian information and psychological campaigns.  An instruction manual for the 
Russian Armed Forces articulates that Russia’s strategy is “to carry out mass 
psychological campaigns against the population of a state in order to destabilize society 
and the government; and force that state to make decisions in the interests of its 
opponents.”162  Furthermore, despite the acute awareness by the Baltic States of Russian 
disinformation campaigns, their countermeasures are specifically designed to inform and 
protect their ethnic majority citizens163, with little action taken to actively counter 
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Russian-language information campaigns targeting their ethnic Russian minorities.164  As 
such, the United States should create task-force dedicated to digital information 
operations in the Russian language to actively and quickly engage and counter Russia’s 
information campaign subordinated to the joint US State Department/Department of 
Defense interagency Russian Influence Group (RIG). 
The RIG is a joint working group between the US military’s European Command 
(EUCOM) and the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, in 
which “all 49 U.S. missions located in Europe and Eurasia are required to develop, 
coordinate, and execute tailored action plans for rebuffing Russian influence operations 
in their host countries.”165  While the RIG is capable of identifying Russian influence 
operations and developing/coordinating policy to respond to them and to provide 
messaging to US allies through its subcomponent Communications Engagement 
Group,166 it needs the capability to actively and persistently compete with Russian 
narratives in the Russian language.  This is necessary as current Baltic frameworks for 
countering Russian propaganda and information operations do not do so in the Russian 
language and targeting their ethnic Russian minorities, despite their vulnerability to such 
actions because of their overwhelming reliance upon Russian-language media and 
primarily interacting within Russian-language information spaces. 
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Additionally, the United States needs to invest more into the production and 
provision of Russian language media through organizations such as Voice of America 
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Through the creation of Current Time, a 24/7 
Russian-language news channel by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of 
America167, the United States government has made an important first step.  Currently, 
these services provide an alternative point of view for news in the Russian language to 
that produced by Russian media outlets.  However, one of the key issues with their 
service is that they have little to no entertainment value, which reduces their desirability 
and, therefore, their penetration with Russian-speaking audiences.  For these services to 
compete in the marketplace of Russian-language media, they must have the funds and 
capability to produce wide-ranging media which is desirable for its intended audiences 
for more than news.  Additionally, through digital and social media, the consumption of 
information is no longer primarily through television.  While both VoA and RFE/RL 
have an online presence, they serve primarily as a news alternative for Russian-speaking 
audiences, and do not have a large and active online community, so these organizations 
must also grow to develop their own community of active Russian-speakers who engage 
with other Russian-speakers across cyber mediums. 
CHALLENGES FOR THESE POLICIES 
Despite the simultaneous security and humanitarian benefits which would result 
from the implementation of these policies, they are still faced with significant obstacles 
and hurdles.  Several of these policies would require significant involvement of the US 
State Department, whose anemic budget significantly limits its ability to realize those 
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policies which would require substantial funding.  Second, those policies which hinge 
upon ability of the United States to exert influence through and upon international 
institutions face two obstacles:  the significant diplomatic influence of the United States 
is not as persuasive when it is not a member of the institution it seeks to influence (such 
as the EU), and its policy objectives involving NATO would require a shift in strategic 
thinking concerning the overwhelming preference for professional armed forces over 
conscription models. 
First, the anemic state of funding for the US State Department is a significant, but 
not unsurmountable, challenge for the implementation of some of the proposed policies.  
First, the construction and operation of public, English-language secondary schools in the 
Baltic states would entail not only high initial costs, but enduring costs for the pay of 
teachers, administrators, maintenance fees, etc.  Furthermore, the fact that the highest 
concentration of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States are large, urban centers will only 
increase both initial and continuing costs.  There are ways to alleviate these costs, 
however.  Wealthy private donors, for example, have previously been instrumental in 
such enterprises, such as the endowments provided by the Open Society Foundations of 
philanthropist George Soros in developing Liberal universities and civil society groups in 
former Soviet states.  The United States could also use its substantial influence in 
international institutions, such as the United Nations, to vector funding towards this 
benign and altruistic endeavor.  Finally, but perhaps most difficult, United States policy 
makers would likely need to significantly increase the funding of the US State 
Department to enable it to undertake significant, grassroots diplomatic efforts such as 
these.   
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The lack of funding for the US State Department impacts not only the proposal 
for English-language secondary schools, but significantly impacts its ability to revive its 
Russian-language information operations.  As previously noted, the creation of Current 
Time, a 24/7 Russian-language news channel by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and 
Voice of America168, the United States government has made an important first step.  
However, through digital and social media, the consumption of information is no longer 
primarily through television.  The US State Department would require significant 
budgetary increases in order to compete with Russia’s disinformation campaign and 
information operations in the realm of cyberspace.  Such an undertaking would require 
significant resources, including information operators with native-level fluency in 
Russian, foreign service officers dedicated to planning and managing the campaign, and a 
robust capability to respond quickly to Russian-produced narratives with professional-
level media productions tailored specifically to the Russian populations in the Baltic 
States.  Furthermore, this capability must reside within the US State Department, and 
cannot be adequately operated by the US Department of Defense, as it requires a purely 
foreign-policy driven focus, intense and persistent regional and cultural expertise, and 
dedicated staff not subject to regular changes of station.  This is, again, not an entirely 
insurmountable obstacle.  As previously noted, private endowments and funds could 
provide a significant boon, especially in the production of traditional media by the 
privately-run Radio Free Europe/Radio Europe enterprise.  Additionally, through 
interagency cooperation efforts such as the Russian Influence Group, the US State 
Department could take advantage of the significant resources and authorities available 
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through EUCOM.  However, to run such tailored and persistent information operations in 
the cyber arena will necessitate substantial funds come from the US State Department’s 
budget. 
Finally, for the US to influence the Baltic States indirectly through international 
institutions faces obstacles in the degree to which the US is able to influence the policies 
of the European Union and necessitates a shift in strategic thinking in NATO.  Firstly, in 
the case of NATO, the US is extremely capable in influencing the policies and agendas of 
the military alliance.  The largest obstacle would be the necessity for American NATO 
leaders to pursue a shift in strategic thinking.  The US is a proponent of professionalized 
military services because of its own military history as well as the benefits it produces in 
producing effective armed forces which are also more easily interoperable.  However, 
especially for countries which have small populations but face threats from larger 
powers, the realities of their situation dictate that conscription provides more of a 
deterrent because it enables them to maintain large inactive reserve forces which can be 
mobilized in times of a crisis.  Sweden, for example, returned to a conscription service 
for precisely these reasons in 2017.  As such, American military leaders will need to 
accept this nuance in the structure of NATO member states’ security needs and support 
the Baltic States to return to/enhance conscription military models, including to assist in 
subsidizing the increase of defense spending necessary for such models.  Second, the 
most significant hurdle for the policy of promoting standards within the EU is the 
variable degrees of penetration that United States diplomacy has to influence the 
organization’s leadership.  Despite the close relationship that the United States holds with 
both the EU itself as well as its array of member states, the United States is a non-
member and thus its degree of influence in organizational decision-making of the EU is 
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significantly limited.  As such, United States policy makers will have to pursue sustained 
diplomatic efforts with the most influential member states of the EU to promote its policy 
recommendations and will likely need to provide substantial incentives as the proposed 
EU policies will entail both political and financial costs for EU member states. 
CONCLUSION 
The Baltic States currently experience the cobra effect regarding their security 
concerns and solutions to the threat posed by their ethnic Russian populations.  Because 
of persistent Russian threats and a history of exploitation of ethnic Russians living in its 
near abroad to disrupt states, the Baltic States are wary of their Russian populations.  To 
varying degrees, these fears are realized in the laws, security policies and rhetoric of the 
Baltic governments which results in an increased vulnerability to Russian influence and 
interference.  This research has revealed that Lithuania is less vulnerable than the other 
two states, not because its ethnic Russian population is a smaller percentage of its 
citizenry, but because it has successfully pursued policies which integrated its ethnic 
Russians into a greater national and societal identity.  Latvia and Estonia, however, have 
pursued policies not of integration but of assimilation, resulting in an increased 
vulnerability to Russian exploitation of ethnic Russians through both perceived and real 
issues of disenfranchisement and limitations of rights.  As the threat by Russia grew due 
to its invasion of Georgia and the annexation of Crimea, Latvia and Estonia have taken 
stricter approaches in their attempts to assimilate their minorities and reduce the influence 
of their ethnic Russian populations in civil society, making them more vulnerable to 
Russian influence, propaganda, and as justification for Russian intervention.   
 
 
67 
The nature of this problem as perpetuated through domestic Baltic State policies 
has limited the United States from pursuing direct diplomatic influence to reduce this 
threat, and instead pursue form of military reassurance measures.  However, the research 
has revealed that the Baltic States are not immune from the pressures of international 
institutions it desires to join or operate within.  Furthermore, the United States would be 
able to pursue grassroots diplomatic measures aimed at supporting long-term societal 
integration measures for ethnic Russians and the Baltic States’ ethnic majorities.  
Additionally, this research has identified a significant gap in information engagement 
with ethnic Russians on behalf of both the Baltic States and NATO to counter Russian 
influence which, if closed, would significantly reduce the threat to the Baltic States. 
The security dilemma facing the Baltic States is not one which can be resolved 
through short-term policy choices.  A long history of threat and subjugation by Russia 
has left the Baltic States fearful of Russian influence, especially in light of Russia’s 
recent adventurism in its near abroad.  This threat is only exacerbated by the domestic 
security policies and responses taken by the Baltic State governments.  If the United 
States wants to reduce the threat posed by Russia to the Baltic States, it must pursue more 
than military reassurance measures and focus on facilitating the integration of ethnic 
Russians into their Baltic societies and countering Russia’s propaganda and information 
operations in the Russian language.  The cobra effect can only be completely resolved by 
the Baltic States addressing and changing their own policies, but the United States has an 
opportunity to promote long-term changes which will fortify its Baltic allies against 
Russian influence. 
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